

Separation of Powers Law

Cases and Materials

FOURTH EDITION

Peter M. Shane

JACOB E. DAVIS AND JACOB E. DAVIS II CHAIR IN LAW
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW

Harold H. Bruff

ROSENBAUM PROFESSOR OF LAW EMERITUS AND DEAN EMERITUS
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW SCHOOL

Neil J. Kinkopf

PROFESSOR OF LAW
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